Military Agreements

ROLE:

Are DCs important? In the associated work, DCAs are analyzed as an independent variable. Footnote 20 Here I briefly predicted these results. Diplomatic correspondence shows that traditional military alliances are increasingly seen as insufficient for today`s global security environment. Shortly after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, American diplomats reported that the new French government considered its alliances with African governments to be “manifestly absurd and obsolete”. Footnote 21 France has attempted to “radically transform the current system of defence agreements, most of which were traditional post-colonial defence pacts, focusing instead on “fighting trafficking and terrorist acts”, while promoting “defence and security cooperation that promotes the enhancement of African peacekeeping capabilities.” Footnote 22 African leaders have supported these changes. Comoros, for example, called for a “new military cooperation agreement with France” that focused not on traditional issues of mutual defence, but on “training and exchange programmes”.” Footnote 23 In conclusion, I turn to H4 to examine the mechanisms of cause and effect. If states have direct means to obtain information on the preferences of a potential partner, they should rely less on third-party sources. I see four possible direct sources: (1) ambassadorial relations that allow governments to exchange information on diplomatic corps, military attachés and possibly espionage; (2) membership in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) allowing governments to exchange information on ministers in institutional for a; (3) adherence to highly structured IGOs, which can enhance the credibility of information; and (4) highly ionized military alliances requiring a certain degree of contact, integrated command, common troop positions or other confidence-building mechanisms. The appendix lists the sources of operationalization and data. An edifying example of the controversial negotiations between Singapore and Indonesia in 2007. In response to Singapore`s request to access Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA contained an apparently benevolent implementation agreement that referred to an “Area Bravo” southwest of the Indonesian islands natuna. Footnote 48 Almost immediately after the signing of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of dishonesty and began speculating on the “wide margin” that the Singaporean army would exercise in the Bravo region. which includes naval exercises, air support, live fires and even the participation of third parties, which, given Singapore`s growing military might, would likely strengthen over time.

Footnote 49 The Indonesian Defence Minister, who echoes the ambiguities of the agreement, said that “Singapore still wants its own rules without having to negotiate… about their military training here. Footnote 50 He added: “We want clear rules of the game on the frequency and extent of military training in Singapore, including the number of opportunities for the number of times Singapore can launch its missiles on our territory.” Footnote 51 While Singapore`s true preferences remain opaque, the Indonesian government`s mere perception of dual language was enough to derail the procedure. A final important feature is that defense partners often sign multiple DCAs. They may, for example, replace a previous agreement or simply prefer a piecemeal approach in which they deal with issues in separate agreements and not in a single general agreement. In practice, during the 1980-2010 period, about half of the countries that signed a CAD signed at least one.